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Abstract—Current research into discovering important inter-
mediate nodes in a network suspected of containing criminal
activity, is highly dependent on network centrality values. Be-
tweenness centrality, for example, is widely used to rank the nodes
that act as brokers in the shortest paths connecting all source with
all end nodes in a network. However both the shortest path node
betweenness as well as the linearly scaled betweenness can only
show rankings for all the nodes in a network, and not for just a
subset of source nodes. In this paper we explore the mathematical
concept of pair-dependency of a source on intermediate nodes,
adapting the concept to criminal relationships and introducing
a new source-intermediate reliance measure. To illustrate our
measure, we apply it to rank the nodes in the Enron email
dataset and the Noordin Top Terrorist networks. We compare
the reliance ranking with Google PageRank, Markov centrality
as well as betweenness centrality and show that a criminal
investigation using the reliance measure, will lead to a different
prioritisation in terms of possible people to investigate. While
the ranking for the Noordin Top terrorist network yields more
extreme differences than the Enron email transaction network,
in the latter the reliance values for the set of finance managers
immediately identified another employee convicted of money
laundering.
Index Terms—Shortest path, betweenness, intermediate node,
reliance
EDICS Category: FOR-OTHS, OTH-BGDT
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of methods have been proposed for ranking the
important nodes in a network. One such measure, the between-
ness centrality attributes importance to intermediate nodes in a
path as these nodes are necessary to retain the flow within the
network [7]. However, given a node of interest, u, betweenness
centrality cannot rank the nodes important only to u, instead
ranking the nodes with regards to ensuring flow in the network
as a whole. In this paper, we present a new measure, the
reliance measure, that achieves this aim of ranking nodes based
on their importance to a given node. Knowing one suspect, our
reliance measure would allow the creation of an ordered list of
trusted connections. Thus this method of ranking nodes would
enable an investigator to prioritize her search for criminal
connections. Our research has the specific aim of aiding the
investigation of money laundering crimes, where it is often
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difficult to identify influential entities with respect to the main
source of illegal money by using only data mining techniques
[22], [28], [37], [42].
To show the versatility of our measure, we apply it to rank
nodes in the Enron dataset [12] and the Noordin Top Terrorist
networks [17]. Our reliance measure is able to show clear
differences in the ranking of particular Enron employees as
well as within members of the terrorist network making it easy
to pick important people for further investigation. In contrast,
the betweenness centrality ranking of the same nodes does
not indicate any nodes of interest. Indeed, in our experiment,
using the set of Enron finance managers, the reliance ranking
highlights an employee who was not a finance manager, but
was convicted of money laundering.
The most well known method of ranking intermediate
nodes in a network is betweenness centrality. The betweenness
centrality of a node is a measure that computes the number
of geodesics (shortest paths) going through that node. In a
network, the node that appears the most number of times in
the shortest paths linking every pair of nodes or components
acts as a broker or intermediary [5], [35], and has the highest
betweenness centrality value. Researchers, including Xu and
Chen [41], and Morselli [33], have used betweenness centrality
to identify a gatekeeper in criminal networks while others,
[16], [19], have used it to identify potential persons of influ-
ence in these networks. Cantanese et al. [11], for example,
utilise multiple network metrics in their log analysis tool to
identify key members in a criminal network, in particular,
using betweenness centrality to show the communication con-
trol of one node over other nodes. In all of this research
betweenness centrality is directly used to identify an important
node that provides the communication path to many other
nodes. However, using betweenness centrality and/or degree
centrality is insufficient when identifying important nodes in
a money laundering network.
Money laundering networks are inherently different to other
criminal networks, in that they may have many members who
are important to a suspect but the nature of the crime dictates
that these members are hidden or inactive (not possessing a
high centrality value). Research, for example [18] and [29],
shows that the node with highest betweenness centrality could
also have the highest closeness as well as highest degree
centrality. Both of these latter attributes point to nodes that
are highly visible. Thus, using betweenness centrality alone
is an impractical way of picking an important person in a
money laundering network. In addition, in money laundering,
a suspect could rely more on a person at quite some distance
from them. We address both of these issues in this paper.
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2Our research, thus, starts with the idea of dependence. Re-
searchers have approached the task of finding influential nodes
by combining the concept of dependence with betweenness,
where the dependence of node i on node j in a network
reflects in some way the influence of node j on node i [27].
Dependency can be said to exist when there is information
flow between a source and a destination. For example, while
identifying important people in the Enron email dataset, Shetty
et al. [36] characterised email link dependency in various
ways; an email was marked as dependent on another when
both the emails appeared within the same time frame, a major
part was copied from one email to another, and the received
email was then forwarded, or when the links in the email
were based on a particular event. The authors based these
characterisations on intuition and domain knowledge which
makes it difficult to interpret the relationships, discovered by
them, between individuals.
In this paper, we propose a new dependency formula to
calculate the dependence of a source node on an intermedi-
ate node. We name this dependency, reliance. The reliance
formula is used as a tool to build a source-intermediate node
reliance measure algorithm that can measure the suspicious
sub-network that contains the criminals and/or suspects and
their associates. The reliance values are used to rank the
nodes upon which a criminal relies. This could then allow
the identification of nodes that are relied on by a group of
known suspects and thus progress the criminal investigation.
The commonly deployed centrality measures, including
betweenness centrality, compute the central value of a node by
summing the values over all source nodes in a network. Our
reliance formula focuses on a particular source node and on
the intermediate nodes in the shortest paths from this particular
source node to every possible end node in the network. Our
interest is in the relationship between a specific source node
(either a criminal or suspect) and its intermediate nodes be-
cause an intermediary carrying information tends to hide illicit
activity either on purpose or inadvertently [10]. Campbell
[10] mentions in his paper that organized crimes such as
money laundering, smuggling, and trafficking of antiquities
can be linked to criminals who have multiple associations.
Thus, a mafia member who acts as an intermediary in a mafia
endeavor could escape criminal charges, as, most commonly,
identification is done by computing the central value of a node;
summing over all possible source nodes in the network, and
the intermediary may not stand out in this manner.
We illustrate the use of our reliance measure by applying it
to the Enron email transactions [12], obtaining a reliance sub-
network to aid a money laundering criminal investigation. His-
tory shows that some senior officials at Enron were involved
in accounting irregularities [1] leading to an investigation
of various internal business and financial activities including
the partnerships set up by some finance managers. This was
followed in early January 2002 by an inquiry into other
criminal activities involving many Enron executives [14], and
finally to the conviction of 10 individuals of money laundering
[8]. In [31], we built a shortest path network search algorithm
(SPNSA) using shortest paths combined with two centrality
measures; eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality.
We applied this SPNSA [30], [31] to the Enron dataset,
extracting a sparse and more manageable network of people
for further criminal investigation. The method in [30] began
with the identification of a list of suspects (the algorithm
feed) to extract a sub-network. Here we use the new reliance
measure proposed in this paper to calculate the reliance values
and rank each intermediate node of each suspect in this
extracted network. For the purpose of illustration, we com-
pare our reliance ranking with three other ranking measures;
betweenness, Google PageRank and Markov centrality.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section II
contains the definitions and mathematical terms used, while
section III describes the proposed method of calculating the
reliance of source nodes on the intermediate nodes. In the
section following this, we compare the pair-dependency for-
mula given by Freeman [21], Brandes [6], and Geisberger et
al. [23] with our reliance method as well as quantifying the
difference between the reliance measure and Geisberger et al.’s
formula. Section V describes the two datasets; the Enron email
transactions and the Noordin Top Terrorist networks used in
our experiments. In section VI we apply the reliance measure
to these two datasets to show the difference in ranking between
the reliance measure and the Brandes and Geiseberger et al.
measures. as well as comparing the reliance rankings with
those found using both the Markov walk-path and the Google
Pagerank algorithms. Section VII details the prioritisation of
nodes for the purpose of a criminal investigation. Finally we
give the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Since our reliance formula is closely related to the between-
ness centrality measure, we will start with the necessary graph-
theoretic terminology [25], and the three main definitions of
betweenness; Freeman [21], Brandes [6] and Geisberger et al.
[23]. For more details see Brandes [7] and Newman [34].
Let G = (V,E) be a graph where V = {v1, v2, ...} is the
set of vertices (also called nodes) and E = {e1, e2, ...} the set
of edges (representing the connections between the vertices),
with the total number of vertices and edges given by |V | =
n and |E| = m, respectively. An edge that has the same start
node and end node is called a self-loop or a loop. If more than
one edge is associated with a pair of nodes, these are called
multiple edges. For our purpose, we exclude all self-loops and
consider multiple edges as one edge.
A path is a sequence of edges that connects multiple nodes
[34]. Given a path (s, t), we call s the source node and t the
destination, end node or target node. In between the source and
the target, lies the alternating sequence of nodes and edges,
for instance, s, e1(s, v1), v1, e2(v1, v2), v2, ..., et(vi, t), t, that
make up the path (s, t). Here e(u, v) denotes the edge connect-
ing nodes u and v. In the graph G, the length of an (s, t)-path
is the number of edges it contains, and the distance, µ(s, t),
from s to t is defined as the minimum length of any (s, t)-path
if one exists and undefined otherwise [7]. Let the number of
shortest paths from s to t be given by σst, and let σst(v) be
the number of shortest paths from s to t that pass through v.
Definition 1 (Freeman [21]). The pair-dependency δst(v) of
3a pair of nodes s and t on an intermediate node v is the
proportion of the shortest paths from s to t that contain v,
that is:
δst(v) =
σst(v)
σst
(1)
The betweenness centrality of v is then the sum of all such
pair-dependencies [21]:
BC(v) =
∑
s6=v 6=t∈V
δst(v) (2)
In 2001, Brandes [6] introduced an algorithm for computing
betweenness centrality in a network.
Definition 2 (Brandes’ Algorithm [6]). The dependence of s
on an intermediate node v is given by:
δs∗(v) =
∑
w:v∈Ps(w)
σsv
σsw
(1 + δs∗(w)) (3)
Here {w : v ∈ Ps(w)} is the set of all nodes w where v is
an immediate predecessor of w in a shortest path from s to
w, that is v ∈ Ps(w).
According to Brandes [6], δs∗(v), the dependence of s on v
is positive, that is δs∗(v) > 0 only when v lies on at least one
shortest path from s to t and on any such path there is exactly
one edge {v, w} with v ∈ Ps(w). The Brandes’ algorithm
has been used among other things, to identify the highest
betweenness of an edge that separates two communities [38].
In 2008, Geisberger et al. applied a linear scaling to
Brandes’ algorithm by introducing the length function (unit
edge weight) [23] thus obtaining a better approximation for
betweenness centrality on large networks without overestimat-
ing the values for the nodes near a pivot or parent node which
was the case with Brandes’ algorithm [6].
Definition 3 (Geisberger et al. [23]). Given a shortest path
from source s to a node w with node v a predecessor of w
on this path, the length function is the ratio of the distance
µ(s, v) of v from s to the distance of w from s, µ(s, w). Thus,
the dependence of s on an intermediate node v changes to:
δs∗(v) =
∑
w:v∈Ps(w)
µ(s, v)
µ(s, w)
[
σsv
σsw
× (1 + δs∗(w))] (4)
While Brandes’ algorithm gives good exact results for small
networks, often it is not possible to get exact results in
reasonable running time for large networks. With this change,
Geiseberger et al., could apply betweenness centrality to real
world situations such as choosing improved highway-node
routings [23], [24].
III. THE RELIANCE MEASURE
As mentioned before, the betweenness centrality algorithms,
given in the previous section, cannot calculate dependence
for particular source nodes. In our proposed reliance formula,
we start with a specific set of source nodes {s1, s2, ...} and
calculate the reliance (a.k.a. “dependency”) value for each
intermediate node v that occurs on paths starting from each
si to all possible end nodes t. Thus, we consider all shortest
paths from a particular source s to all possible end nodes t
where s 6= t, and the source node s comes from a specific
set of interest, rather than all possible nodes as is done in
equations (2), (3) and (4).
In the first part of our formula, we calculate the proportion
of the shortest paths linking source s to all nodes t, that contain
v (equation (1)), and call it the importance rate IR(s,t)(v). We
name the pair dependency of equation (1) as the importance
rate of v as it indicates how often the node v is relied on by
s to complete a path from s to a destination t in proportion
to all paths from s to t.
The second part of our formula gives a trust value that the
source s places on v to pass messages to any t along the
shortest paths. This trust value allows the measuring of trust
between nodes that are far away from each other. The idea that
someone has to trust a person much further down the chain of
communication is an important concept in money laundering.
Verbiest et al. [39] in their research incorporating path
length and trust aggregation declare that the shorter the dis-
tance from source s to v, the more the source s trusts v.
Similarly, De Meo et al. [15] design an algorithm to compute
edge centrality using k-path length with the assumption that
the influence between two nodes reduces when the distance
between them increases. Indeed, a common way to start a
criminal investigation process is to identify the closest node
to a criminal or source because the shorter the distance from
the source, the higher the chances the node is the source’s
subordinate [32].
This is not the case with money laundering. We claim
instead that the further away an intermediate node is from
a source node, the more the source needs to trust that inter-
mediate node to pass on a message, in the case of money-
laundering. One of the stages of money laundering is the
layering of money [3] where the money is moved to different
channels or banks through intermediaries such as corporations
or trusts. The criminals are consequently connected to multiple
bank accounts that are, in turn, connected to other people. The
intermediaries are different people in the middle who help
to channel the money to these different destinations so as to
obscure its illegal source.
Thus, the layering process in money laundering involves
multiple transactions of money through various channels [3],
[4]. In such a money layering process, money below the thresh-
old is distributed to different financial institutions or accounts.
This contributes to the growth in the length of the paths that are
used to transport the money from a source to a destination. The
source uses longer and longer sequences of channels to divide
and distribute smaller amounts of money making it more and
more difficult for law enforcement authorities to identify the
influential people [3], [4]. Clearly, this upholds our claim that
in a crime such as money laundering, the source of the illegal
funds has to place more trust on a person further down the
chain.
The trust formula defined below is able to measure this
increased trust.
4Definition 4 (Trust). Given a graph G = (V,E), s a source
node and v an intermediate node on some path (s, t) from s
to an end node t, the trust of s on v, relative to the path (s, t)
denoted by T(s,t)(v), is given by:
T(s,t)(v) =
µ(s, v)
µ(s, t)
, for t 6= s, s 6= v 6= t (5)
where µ(s, u) is the minimum distance (number of edges) from
s to u along the path (s, t), u ∈ V , if one exists and undefined
otherwise.
We illustrate the trust concept using a representative money
laundering network.
Example 1. In Figure 1, let 1 be the source node and 8 the
destination or end node. A path from source 1 to destination
8 is:
1 → 2 → 3 → 5 → 7 → 8
Fig. 1: A representation of a small money laundering network.
Node 1 could be considered the source and node 8, the destination
of the money. The floating-point numbers near each node represent
the trust placed by source node 1 on each intermediate node from
the set {2, 3, 5, 7} in the path 1 → 2 → 3 → 5 → 7 → 8.
Suppose Figure 1 is a representation of a money laundering
network and node 1 was a money laundering suspect. An
example of when this might be the case is the layering of
illegal money. Hence consider Figure 1 as representing the
layering of illegal money within a money laundering syndicate,
with node 1 the source of the money being laundered.
In such a scenario, the source node (node 1 in Figure 1)
needs to trust node 7 (at distance 4) more than node 3 (at
distance 2) to pass on the message (or money) to node 8. This
difference is reflected in the trust value, with T(1,8)(7) = 45
while T(1,8)(3) = 25 .
However, it is insufficient to just have a trust value, as the
number of paths that exist from a source and a destination
would also play a role, as would the number of paths that the
particular intermediate node lies on, to work out the reliance
of the source on this intermediary. Thus, we incorporate the
importance rate and the trust value of an intermediate node,
to get the reliance of source s on an intermediate node v.
We focus on a particular source, s, that we call a suspect
and our motive is to calculate the reliance of this suspect on
the intermediate nodes that reside along all paths (s, t).
Definition 5 (Reliance). Given a graph G = (V,E), with
|V | = n, a source node s and an intermediate node v
on some path from s to a particular end node t, given by
(s, t), the reliance of s on v along the path (s, t), r(s,t)(v)
for v ∈ (s, t), t 6= s, s 6= v 6= t, is the product of the impor-
tance rate IR(s,t)(v) and the trust T(s,t)(v):
r(s,t)(v) = δst(v)× µ(s, v)
µ(s, t)
(6)
Equation (6) gives the reliance of s on v along a particular
path (s, t). Hence, the total reliance of source s on v over all
paths from s to all possible end nodes t, is:
Rs(v) =
∑
{t:v∈(s,t),t6=s,s 6=v 6=t}
r(s,t)(v)
(n− 2) (7)
Since |V | = n, that is, there are n vertices in the graph,
and since the start node s and the intermediate node v are
fixed and r(s,t)(v) is taken for all t, where t 6= s, s 6= v 6= t,
there are (n− 2) possible values for t, thus, we normalise the
reliance value, Rs(v) with (n− 2).
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT DEPENDENCY
TECHNIQUES
We compare our reliance measure to the betweenness cal-
culations given by Freeman [21] (equation (2)), Brandes [6]
(equation (3)) and Geisberger et al. [23] (equation (4)), and
show that even though all four formulae use the dependency
given by equation (1) with, in addition, Geisberger et. al’s
formula using a version of the length function, there are
fundamental differences in these formulae and that the reliance
formula is best able to do the job of ranking nodes with respect
to a particular source.
Example 2. Comparison of reliance with Freeman [21],
Brandes [6] and Geisberger et al. [23] betweeneness. We use
the graph in Figure 1 to compare the reliance of node 1 on
intermediate nodes of the network with the values assigned to
the intermediate nodes by the three dependency measures, as
given by equations (2), (3) and (4) respectively. The results
are shown in Figure 2.
The reliance (dependency) of node 1 on itself is zero.
Similarly, the reliance and dependence value of node 1 on
node 8 are zero because there is no shortest path from source
1 to any possible end node that contains 8 as an intermediate
node. The biggest difference that we can see from the graph
in Figure 2 is in the dependence of node 1 on node 3. Both
Freeman and Brandes give the dependence value of node 3
as less than that of node 2, whereas Geisberger et. al puts
the dependence value of node 3 as more than that of node
2. Similarly the reliance measure has node 1 relying more on
node 3 than on node 2. The network in Figure 1 is undirected
and node 3 is at the crucial position of separation between
two sets of nodes. Removing node 3 cuts the information flow
from node 1 and node 2 to the other nodes. Thus, based on
the position of the nodes, the dependence and the reliance
value of node 1 on node 3 should be intuitively higher. Both
Geisberger et. al’s technique and reliance measure reflect this.
5Fig. 2: The result of applying the different dependency formula
and the reliance formula on the network shown in Figure 1. Here,
for the purpose of comparison we choose node 1 as the source as
and take all shortest paths from this source node to all possible end
nodes. The value of reliance of node 1 on the intermediate nodes is
compared to the dependency values given by eqns. (2), (3) and (4).
Even though the ranking of the nodes in the graph in Figure
1 is the same for Geisberger and reliance, the technique by
Geisberger et. al is different from our reliance formula as the
reliance calculation focuses on the reliance of a specific source
on other nodes whereas, in general, Geisberger et. al’s formula
gives betweenness by considering all sources. Consequently,
as the graph gets bigger, the estimation by Geisberger et.
al ’s technique gets much larger than our reliance measure;
something that is clearly illustrated in the next example.
Example 3. Difference between the reliance formula and
Geisberger et. al’s formula: We use a slightly larger graph
(Figure 3) to illustrate the growth in dependence using Geis-
berger’s formula when compared to the reliance calculation.
Fig. 3: A sample graph. This sample graph is used to compute
the dependency of node 1 on other nodes.
Figure 3 shows a network with 8 nodes. We calculate the
dependency of node 1 on other nodes using Geisberger et al.’s
technique (equation (4)).
δs=1∗(v) =
∑
w:v∈Ps(w)
µ(s,v)
µ(s,w)
[ σsv
σsw
× (1 + δs∗(w))]
=
{∑
{t:v∈(s,t),t 6=s,s 6=v 6=t}
[
µ(s,v)
µ(s,t)
× δst(v)
]}
+{
2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,6)
[σs2
σs6
]
}
+ 2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,7)
[σs2
σs7
]
}
+ 5
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,8)
[σs2
σs8
]
}}
= Rs(v) + 2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,6)
[σs2
σs6
]
}
+ 2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,7)
[σs2
σs7
]
}
+5
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,8)
[σs2
σs8
]
}
(8)
Thus equation (4) over-estimates the dependency by{
2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,6) [
σs2
σs6
]
}
+ 2
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,7) [
σs2
σs7
]
}
+ 5
{
µ(s,2)
µ(s,8) [
σs2
σs8
]
}}
due
to the repetitive dependency calculation of the source node on
nodes 6, 7 and 8. Thus the direct use of the Geiberger et al.
formula for the purpose of calculating reliance would result in
an overestimation of the dependence values of certain nodes,
a fact that becomes clear in section VI. While Geiseberger et
al.’s formula is a good means of estimating values for large
networks, our purpose here is to further refine a possible
network for criminal investigation, and rank nodes for a
specific set of source nodes.
V. DATASETS
We use two different datasets in our experiments - the Enron
dataset and the Noordin Top Terrorist Dataset.
A. The Enron Network
In [30], we first divided the Enron email dataset, which
consist of 1,887,305 email transactions into two groups; emails
that were sent using only the fields ‘TO/CC’ and those
emails that also contained ‘BCC’ recipients. Our SPNSA
implementation in [31] was based on the number of BCC
recipients needed to identify a trust network, where the focus
was on emails that contained one or two recipients bcc-ed. By
their very nature, ‘BCC ’email transactions contain recipients
that are kept secret [20]. In [30], our experimental results
showed that the undirected BCC email transactions have the
most number of criminals in the shortest paths network, thus
further analysis was conducted using only the BCC email
transactions. In this paper, both the ‘TO/CC’ and ‘BCC’
undirected email transaction networks are used to produce the
reliance sub-networks for all suspects. Through dividing the
email transactions, we are able to compare the important nodes
that a suspect relies on, whether or not the connection (email)
is kept secret (bcc-ed). To form an undirected network, we
make the broad assumption that an email sent from A to B
or from B to A implies an undirected relationship between A
and B.
The majority, 87.3%, of email transactions in the Enron
dataset, use the fields ‘TO/CC’, while 12.7% are ‘BCC’ email
transactions (i.e. they contain bcc’ed recipients). The email
transactions in this dataset comprise of external and internal
email addresses where the external email addresses are those
that do not have ‘@enron’ whereas the internal emails do. The
6email addresses are the nodes and we give importance to the
sequence of emails exchanged by the nodes rather than the
content of the emails. As in [30], [31], here too the sets of
source nodes, consisting of Enron finance managers as well
as a few others who held top posts, were selected based on
the possibility of having been involved in money laundering
and are henceforth called suspects, and used as feed to the
SPNSA algorithm [31]. We run our experiments using two sets
of suspects; the first set of suspects consisting of the Enron
finance managers [2] while the second, larger, set comprises
of all managers [2] including the finance managers. Both sets
were collected from a report on the chronology of events
related to the collapse of Enron [2].
A manager may be indexed by more than one node if
he or she has more than one email account. The two email
transaction groups, ‘TO/CC’ and ‘BCC’, have distinct ID sets
for the different email addresses, designed as such because,
somewhat surprisingly, some nodes that exist in the ‘BCC’
group do not exist in the ‘TO/CC’ group. The network formed
using the ‘BCC’ email transaction subset has 19,716 nodes and
65,532 edges while the network formed using the ‘TO/CC’
email transaction subset has 26,027 nodes and 252,863 edges.
All self-loops and multiple edges have been removed from
these networks.
B. The Noordin Top Terrorist Network
The second dataset that we use to compare rankings is the
Noordin Top terrorist network [17]. This dataset is small and
consists of different types of connections. The first group of
connections gives the terrorists’ affiliations such as terrorist
organisations, educational institutions, business and religious
institutions. The second group contains relationship informa-
tion such as classmates, kin, friends with the third group
comprising of individuals that provided logistical support
or participated in training events, terrorist operations, and
meetings [17]. We take 2 different subsets from this dataset for
our analysis, the terrorist-friendship and terrorist-classmates.
In our experiment, we rank the terrorists using source-
intermediate reliance value. Since it is a small network, we
do not extract any terrorist sub-network using SPNSA [31]
instead using the terrorist-friendship and terrorist-classmates
networks as they are.
VI. RANKING IMPORTANT NODES USING THE RELIANCE
MEASURE
As we saw in section IV, even in small networks, there is
a difference between the dependence rankings given by the
betweenness centrality methods, and the reliance measure. In
this section, we illustrate further the need for our reliance
measure.
In subsection VI-A, for the purpose of illustration, we
compare the ranking of the nodes in the Enron ‘BCC’ network
using betweenness centrality and the reliance formula. We also
compare the reliance value ranking with the rankings obtained
using a Markov centrality score and the Google PageRank
method.
Random walks are used to calculate Markov centrality
scores [40], with the centrality score of a node being calculated
by first taking the average path length of a random walk
starting at that node and arriving (for the first time) at some
other node, and then averaging over all other nodes. Markov
centrality of the node is then the inverse of the average distance
between it and every other node [13], [40]. The PageRank
algorithm, used by Google to rank important web pages, uses
the assumption that a page is important when it is linked by
many pages or if it is linked to many other important pages
[9], [26]. The mathematical equivalent of this concept is the
eigenvector centrality measure [26].
For the Noordin Top terrorist network, in section VI-B
we use these measures to rank a terrorist, his friends and
classmates to see if there are any differences between reliance
ranking to other measures.
A. Comparing reliance node ranking with betweenness cen-
trality, Markov centrality and PageRank on the Enron network
We use only the Enron BCC Network for this part of the
experiments. We compare the node rankings resulting from
using the betweenness centrality proposed by Brandes and
Geisberger et.al with the results produced using the reliance
measure on particular subsets of the Enron ‘BCC’ network.
Since betweenness centrality measures the dependency of all
source nodes on v, we decided that a comparison was best
done by comparing the betweenness value of a node v with
its combined reliance value
∑
s∈S Rs(v), obtained by taking
the sum of the reliance of all s in the subset S, where S is the
set of all finance managers (respectively, all managers), on this
v in the Enron finance manager (respectively, manager) BCC
sub-networks. The nodes v are ranked based on the decending
order of betweenness centrality (Brandes’ and Geiseberger et.
al) values.
We start our comparisons with the finance manager sub-
network extracted from the BCC network. Five employees
worked as finance managers in Enron between the years
1990-2001 and were used as the SPNSA’s [31] feed. These
finance managers [2] were Andrew Fastow (686, 687), Sherron
Watkins (16929), Ben Glisan (1369), Rick Causey (15077)
and Jeff McMahon (8071) and the sub-network extracted, the
Enron Finance Manager BCC sub-network, had 30 nodes and
53 edges. As mentioned before, the betweenness centrality
measures by Brandes and Geisberger et al. calculate the
centrality value of v using all source nodes. To compare
the reliance value with the betweenness centrality measures,
we take the total reliance of all finance managers, F =
{686, 687, 16929, 1369, 15077, 8071}, on each v in the Enron
finance manager BCC sub-network. Thus, the total reliance
value for each possible intermediate node v is
∑
s∈F Rs(v).
This compares well with the betweenness centrality value for
v in the case of both Brandes and Geiseberger et al. which is
δs ∗ (v) for all s in the sub-network, and not just s ∈ F .
In addition, we normalise the total reliance as well as
the betweenness centrality values obtained using Brandes and
Geisberger et al. by dividing each node’s value with the
maximum value in each set respectively.
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node ranking for the nodes relied on by the Enron finance
managers (in the Enron Finance Manager BCC network) is
depicted in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: The Enron finance manager BCC sub-network node
ranking. The total reliance of all finance managers on each v
in the Enron Finance Manager BCC sub-network is used for this
comparison. The intermediate nodes v are ranked based on the
descending order of betweenness centrality (Brandes) values. There is
a clear difference in node ranking between the total reliance measure
and betweenness centrality measures. For example, node 2473 is more
heavily relied on by the finance managers than 686, where as both
the betweenness centrality measures rank these two the other way
around.
In Figure 4, all three measures identified the same node as
having the highest value. The interesting point is to note that
some of the nodes (for example, 11010, 12935 etc.) ranked
lower by the betweenness centrality measures, are ranked as
being more important by the reliance measure. Node 11010
(lfastow@pop.pdq.net), ranked third by reliance, belongs to
Lea Fastow, who was convicted of money laundering [8], [31].
The total reliance ranking of the intermediate nodes v is next
compared with the other two ranking methods, PageRank and
Markov centrality, in the Enron Finance Manager BCC sub-
network. Again the values are normalised by dividing each
value by the largest value in the respective set. The results
are shown in Figure 5. The nodes are ranked based on the
descending order of PageRank scores.
Fig. 5: The Enron finance manager BCC sub-network node
ranking. The total reliance of all finance managers on each v in
the Enron Finance Manager BCC sub-network is compared with the
PageRank and Markov centrality value of v. The nodes are ranked
based on the descending order of PageRank values. There is a clear
difference in node ranking, with for example, nodes 3945, 3973,
10917 and 7974 being ranked similarly by Markov centrality and
Pagerank method but very differently by the reliance measure.
The bar chart in Figure 5 shows the differences in node
ranking between PageRank, Markov centrality and the reliance
measure. A few interesting differences are visible in this figure.
Nodes 3945, 3973, 10917 and 7974 are ranked very differently
by reliance but similarly by PageRank and Markov centrality.
In contrast, nodes 3983, 687 and 15077 are valued by Markov
centrality and PageRank but not relied on at all by the finance
managers (see figure 5 towards the right of the bar chart).
Finally, 11010 (Lea Fastow) was also not picked out by either
PageRank or Markov centrality.
The comparisons are repeated for all the Enron managers,
a larger algorithm feed, to see again if there is a difference
in the ranking. A shortest paths sub-network is formed using
all the managers and named the Enron Manager BCC sub-
network. This sub-network is an bigger undirected graph with
121 nodes and 314 edges. First the comparison is carried out
between the reliance measure and the betweenness measures,
as before, and the intermediate nodes are ranked based on
descending order of betweenness centrality (Brandes) values.
Fig. 6: The Enron manager BCC sub-network node ranking. The
total reliance of all managers on each v in the Enron Manager BCC
sub-network is compared with the betweenness centrality measures of
Brandes, and Geisberger et al., with rankings ordered in descending
order of Brandes’ betweenness. Note that only the nodes with positive
reliance value are displayed along the X-axis.
Even more than in Figure 4, Figure 6 shows the difference in
the ranking between the betweenness centrality measures and
the reliance measure; the node (17697) picked as the most
important one by the reliance measure is not picked by either
Brandes or Geisberger et. al, both of which pick 15932, a node
regarded as irrelevant by the reliance measure. Moreover, the
betweenness centrality values for nodes 348, 441 and 9395 are
almost the same (and negligible) whereas the reliance measure
shows a different ranking with much higher values.
Finally we compare intermediate node reliance with PageR-
ank and Markov centrality in the Enron Manager BCC sub-
network. The result is shown in Figure 7. The nodes are ranked
based on the descending order of PageRank values. Again
there is a clear difference between the three rankings.
From the comparisons done above, we can see that an
investigation using the reliance measure rather than any of
betweenness centrality, PageRank or Markov centrality rank-
ings, will lead to different, possibly more relevant, people to
investigate. For example, Lea Fastow was not in the algorithm
feed for the experiment [31] using either all managers or
8Fig. 7: The Enron manager BCC sub-network node ranking. The
total reliance of all managers on each intermediate v in the Enron
Manager BCC sub-network is used for this comparison. The inter-
mediate nodes (on the X-axis) are ranked based on the descending
order of PageRank values. There is a clear difference in the ranking of
the nodes using the three different methods. For example PageRank,
Markov centrality and the reliance measure rank nodes 19075, 6673
and 17697 as having the highest value respectively.
finance managers, however, as illustrated in Figure 4, Lea
Fastow, the wife of Andrew Fastow [8] and a convicted money
laundering criminal [8], was heavily relied on by the finance
managers.
B. Comparing reliance node ranking with betweenness cen-
trality, Markov centrality and PageRank in the Noordin Top
terrorist network
Four different bar charts are presented here showing the
comparison of intermediate node reliance with betweenness,
Markov centrality, and PageRank. The terrorist-friendship sub-
network consists of 61 nodes and 91 edges and the terrorist-
classmate sub-network has 39 nodes and 175 edges. We first
isolate the highest reliance of each node on an intermediate
node in the shortest paths between the former node and all
other nodes in the sub-network. We then sum over all the
reliance values for the same intermediate node and normalise
it with the highest value in the list. We do a similar normali-
sation for the betweenness as well as PageRank and Markov
centrality values.The results are shown in Figures 8 and 9.
Both Figures 8 and 9, illustrate the versatility of the reliance
measure, with very few nodes showing up as being relied on
by all the members of the group. Thus, for example, taking
Figure 9(b), an investigator could narrow their first detailed
investigations to just 5 members of the group.
VII. IDENTIFYING CRIME PRIORITY NODES USING THE
RELIANCE MEASURE
The experiment hereafter uses only the Enron dataset and
the reliance measure to get the persons of interest (a.k.a.
“crime priority nodes”) of each finance manager and manager
in both the ‘BCC’ and ‘TO/CC’ network respectively. The
main purpose of these experiments is to identify the interme-
diate nodes important to the suspects, as ranked by the reliance
measure. At this point, we do not corroborate the identified
persons of interest with any published articles or past research.
(a) The terrorist-friendship sub-network nodes ranked using between-
ness centrality by Brandes, Geisberger et al. and reliance.
(b) The terrorist-classmate sub-network nodes ranked using reliance,
betweenness centrality by Brandes and Geisberger et al.
Fig. 8: The nodes v are listed on the X-axis, with the Brandes and
Geiseberger et. al and reliance values obtained by each node depicted
as the height of the bars, with the nodes ranked in descending order of
Brandes’ betweenness centrality values. For each graph, nodes with
zero reliability and with a betweenness (Brandes) value below that
of the node with the lowest reliability, are not included.
A. Extracting the suspects’ crime priority nodes from the
Enron ‘BCC’ email network
We first show the results of identifying the Enron money
laundering suspects’ important nodes in the ‘BCC’ email
network based on suspect-intermediate reliance value. We start
by choosing the Enron finance managers as our source nodes,
and extract the sub-snetwork using SPNSA. The reliance of
each finance manager on every intermediate node (v) in the
path between that finance manager and all other nodes within
the Enron Finance Manager BCC shortest paths sub-network,
is calculated. The intermediate node that each finance manager
relies on the most is identified. The list of these crime-
priority nodes reveals 2 money laundering criminals ( [8], [31])
as important to each other; Ben Glisan (1369) and Andrew
Fastow (686).
Next, we use all managers (including the finance managers)
as the suspects (SPNSA algorithm feed), to see if new people
of interest are obbtained. Unlike the Enron Finance Manager
BCC sub-network, there is no criminal to criminal reliance in
this network. However, nodes that are the persons of interest
to the managers include managers Greg Whalley (6673),
9(a) The terrorist-friendship sub-network nodes ranked using reliance,
PageRank and Markov centrality.
(b) The terrorist-classmate sub-network nodes ranked using Markov
centrality, PageRank and reliance.
Fig. 9: The nodes v are listed on the X-axis, with the PageRank,
Markov and reliance values obtained by each node depicted as the
height of the bars, with the nodes ranked in descending order of
PageRank scores. For each graph, terrorists with zero reliance and
ranked by PageRank scores as below the terrorist with the lowest
reliance, are not included.
President and Chief Operation Officer, and Lou Pai (11357),
CEO of Enron Energy Services.
B. Extracting suspect’s crime priority nodes from the Enron
‘TO/CC’ email network
Using the same method as shown above, we extract the
finance managers’ crime priority nodes from the ‘TO/CC’
shortest paths sub-network. Note that some employees’ email
addresses that exist in the ‘BCC’ network do not occur
in the ‘TO/CC’ network, for example email address (an-
drew.fastow@ljminvestments.com) belonging to Andrew Fas-
tow occurs only in the ‘BCC’ network. Thus, different IDs
were used in the ‘TO/CC’ network.
The finance managers [2] used as the SPNSA algorithm
feed are Andrew Fastow (1472), Sherron Watkins (26577),
Ben Glisan (2521), Rick Causey (24277) and Jeff McMahon
(12919). George Wasaff (george.wasaff@enron.com (10351))
is the intermediate node that all finance managers rely on the
most in this network, which is an interesting fact and could
be the starting point for further investigation.
It is possible that more criminal to criminal connections
would be identified if an investigator picked the best possible
suspects to inspect (based on corroborative information or
interviews). The experiments in this section show that the
reliance measure allows an investigator to find people who
are close to and heavily relied on by the suspects for further
investigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced a new reliance measure to rank
nodes in a network and therefore identify nodes of interest.
This reliance measure is different from betweenness centrality
because the latter calculates the centrality value of a node
for all sources whereas the former calculates the reliance
of a given list of specific sources on a node. We compared
the reliance ranking with other centrality measures, Google
PageRank and Markov centrality, as well as betweenness
centrality. Reliance identified a very different subset of nodes
from those identified by the other measures. We showed that
the ranking based on the reliance measure could also be used
to identify the nodes relied on the most by particular persons
of interest to an investigation.
Our SPNSA as described in [31] is able to produce a
small and manageable network. In this paper we furthered
our research and analysed the connections between nodes in
the network; reliance of one node on another leading possibly
to the identification of important nodes. This reliance method
could reduce the time needed to explore a large network and
hence may speed up an investigation process. It is important
to note that, prior to the application of the shortest paths
network search algorithm [31] and the reliance formula, it is
essential to choose the most relevant suspects to a crime. The
analysis proposed in this paper could also yield more criminal
to criminal connections by choosing the most applicable or
appropriate algorithm feed for a crime incident.
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